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By RiclAn S. WEMaaEG*
John Q. Executive has just been informed that he will receive
a promotion and pay raise of 10,000 dollars per year. Of course,
he is very happy; however, his elation is somewhat diminished
when he realizes that the government will take a large portion of
his pay raise for income taxes. He wonders whether there is some
way to preserve more of this money for himself and his family;
and soon he is listening to an explanation of the benefits to be
derived from the use of a deferred compensation contract to
postpone recognition of income until after he has retired.
After retirement, he will have less income from other sources
so that payments received at that time will be taxed at a lower
rate. Similar tax advantages are available under qualified pension
plans. However, a qualified plan may not be available; and even
if one is available, a deferred compensation contract may be used
to supplement its benefits.
This article will deal only with deferred compensation con-
tracts which do not qualify as pension plans and will briefly sum
up the income tax consequences of such contracts. It will deal at
length with the gift and estate tax consequences of such contracts
and the income taxation of beneficiaries in case the employee dies
before payments under the contract have been completed.
Income Taxation of the Employee and the Employer's Deduction
Under Section 61 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, "gross
income means all income from whatever source derived, including
... compensation for services .. ." There can be no dispute that
payments under a deferred compensation contract must be in-
cluded in gross income. The vital question has been whether
taxation can be postponed until payment is actually received.
* Member, Illinois State Bar. B.A., LL.B., Harvard.
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In 1960, the Internal Revenue Service, by its acquiescence in
Oates v. Commissioner,' and publication of Revenue Ruling
60-31,2 sanctioned postponement of taxation until the employee
received payments under a deferred compensation contract pro-
vided that the "Constructive Receipt" doctrine does not apply to
the arrangement and that the arrangement is not funded.
The "Constructive Receipt" doctrine is based upon the rule
that "income that is subject to a man's unfettered command and
that he is free to enjoy at his own option may be taxed to him as
his income whether he sees fit to enjoy it or not."3 It would apply
if John Q. Executive was handed his salary raise by his employer
and then said "No, you hold this money for me until next year."
In such a case, the income must be reported in the year in which
payment was originally tendered. "A taxpayer may not deliber-
ately turn his back upon income and thereby select the year for
which he will report it."4 In order to avoid application of this
doctrine, a deferred compensation arrangement must be entered
into before the employee has an immediate right to demand pay-
ment for services rendered.5
Funding the employer's obligation by establishing a trust or
purchasing an annuity must also be avoided. As soon as funding
occurs, the employee must recognize income even though he has
no right to sell or assign his interest, unless the arrangement
contains substantial contingencies which could cause the em-
ployee to forfeit his interest.6 Even though it contains con-
tingencies to postpone the employee's recognition of income, a
funded plan is not a satisfactory arrangement because the em-
ployer will probably be denied a deduction for contributions
made under such an arrangement.
Section 404(a)(5) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
1207 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1953).
21960-1 Cum. Bull. 174.
3 Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376, 378 (1930).
4 Rev.-Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 Cum. Bull. 174, 178; citing Hamilton Nat. Bank of
Chattanooga, Administrator, 29 B.T.A. 63, 67 (1933).5 Although the cases indicate that deferral can be made even after the
services have been rendered (Howard Veit, 8 T. C. 809 (1947); Oates v. Com-
missioner, supra note 1), a careful practioner could be expected to negotiate the
deferred compensation arrangement before the services have been rendered when-
ever possible.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 402(b) and § 403(c); see Renton K. Brodie, 1
T.C. 275 (1942); Hackett v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 121 (1st Cir. 1946); United
States v. Drescher 179 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1950), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 821
(1950).
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which governs the employer's deduction, provides that the
deduction will be allowed "in a taxable year when paid, if the
plan is not (a qualified plan), if the employees' rights to or
derived from such employer's contribution or such compensation
are nonforfeitable at the time the contribution or compensation
is paid." According to the Regulations interpreting this section,
"if an amount is paid during the taxable year to a trust or under a
plan and the employee's rights to such amounts are forfeitable
at the time the amount is paid, no deduction is allowable for such
amount for any taxable year."7 Thus, it appears that the only type
of deferred compensation arrangement which will effectively
postpone recognition of income on the part of the employee and
at the same time allow the employer a deduction, is one which
does not provide for funding. Even if an unfunded arrangement
contains contingencies, the employer will get a deduction under
Section 404(a) (5) because the employee's rights are nonfor-
feitable at the moment of payment.
Gift Tax Consequences
If John decides to have payments under a deferred com-
pensation arrangement continue after his death and to name a
beneficiary, it is necessary to examine the question of whether a
gift for gift tax purposes has been made. If such a gift has been
made, it will be necessary to file a gift tax return. (This would
be a gift of a future interest for which no annual exclusion is
allowed. )8
The Internal Revenue Code provides that the gift tax is
imposed on "the transfer of property by gift.. . whether the gift
is direct or indirect and whether the property is ... tangible or
intangible."' (Emphasis added.) The value of the gift is the
value of the property at the date of the gift." These provisions
First, there must be a "transfer." If John Q. Executive reserves
the right to change or revoke his designation of a beneficiary,
contain two important concepts.
7 Treas. Reg. Sec. 1.404 (a)-12; but cf. Russell Mfg. Co. v. United States,
175 F. Supp. 159 (Ct. of Claims 1959).
8 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2503(b); Roberts v. Commissioner, 143 F.2d 657
(5th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 324 U.S. 841 (1945).
9 Id., § 2501(a).
10 Id., § 2511(a).
1Id., § 2512(a).
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then, clearly, there has been no transfer because there has been
no abandonment of control over the property1 2 and no gift. On
the other hand, if the designation of a beneficiary is irrevocable,
this should be considered a "transfer" within the meaning of the
gift tax provisions.
Under a funded arrangement which is nonforfeitable, the
Regulations specifically state that the irrevocable designation of
a beneficiary is a taxable transfer.13 If the funded arrangement
is forfeitable, there may be some questions as to whether a "trans-
fer" has taken place because the employee can defeat the rights
of the beneficiary by refusing to perform one of the conditions
precedent to payment. However, this should also be considered
a transfer because although the employee can defeat the bene-
ficiary's rights, he cannot recover the interest for himself. This
is like saying that when A gives a house to B, there has been no
transfer because A can burn down the house.14 It would also
appear to follow that the irrevocable designation of a beneficiary
under an unfunded contract constitutes a transfer.'5
Second, there must be "property" and there must be "value."
There are two ways of considering these elements. One might
say that an extremely remote and speculative interest is property
but has no value, or that it has no value and, therefore, is not
property but merely an expectancy. Although this appears to be
only a question of semantics, it may be the determining factor.
In the gift tax area, the construction of the sections of the Code
suggest that the determination of whether or not there is property
should be made first, and then the question of value should be
decided.
In considering these questions it is important to avoid applying
the rules set forth for income taxation. The only problem under
the income tax provisions is when the recipient should be taxed,
whereas under the gift and estate tax provisions, the problem is
whether the transferor will be taxed at all. For this reason, "there
32 Smith v. Shaughnessy, 318 U.S. 176, 181 (1943); Treas. Reg., § 25.2511-
2(b)&(c).
13 Treas. Reg., Sec. 25.2511-1(h) (10); cf., Rev. Rul. 58-307, 1958 -1 Gum.
Bull. 206. § 2517 of the 1954 Code excludes certain gifts of interests under a
qualified plan from taxation.
34 Lowndes and Kramer, Federal Estate and Gift Taxes 656 (1956); cf. Est.
of Edward H. Wadewitz, 39 T.C. 925, 937 (1968).
'r But cf., Higg's Estate v. Commissioner, 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950)
discussed suppra.
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is no relationship between the gift and income tax and neither is
dependent on the other as a basis for imposition of a tax." 6
When the general gift tax provisions were originally enacted
as a part of the Revenue Act of 1932, the purpose was to reach
all inter vivos transfers which might diminish the assets of the
transferor's estate; and the committee reports said that the terms
of these sections should be construed "in the broadest and most
comprehensive sense . . . reaching every species of right or
interest protected by law and having an exchangeable value."'7
The Supreme Court has said:
Even though these concepts of property and value may be
slippery and elusive, they cannot escape taxation so long as
they are used in the world of business ... The language of
the gift tax statute . . . is broad enough to include property
however conceptual or contingent.' 8
The purport of these general statements is that any interest, which
has any value at all, is property within the meaning of Section
2501 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
Although there are no gift tax cases dealing directly with
deferred compensation arrangement, three cases warrant con-
sideration.
In Continental Illinois Bank, Executor (for Estate of Aver), 9
property was delivered to the University of Chicago and to New-
berry Library as charitable gifts. These organizations promised
to pay 6,000 dollars per year to the donor for the rest of his life
and then to continue the 6,000 dollars per year payments to his
wife and daughter. The Board of Tax Appeals held that a gift
had been given to the wife and to the daughter. The interest
involved was treated as though it was a commercial annuity even
though the obligor was not an insurance company.
In Cerf. v. Commissioner,20 renewal commissions on life in-
surance policies which would be earned in the future were as-
signed to a trust which benefitted the assignor's wife. The third
16 Galt v. Commissioner, 216 F.2d 41, 45 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 951 (1955).
17H.R. Rep. #708, 72d Cong. 1st Sess., 27 (1982); Sen Rep. #665, 72d
Cong. 1st Sess., 39 (1932).
%8 Smith v. Shaughnessy, supra note 12, at 180.
19 29 B.T.A. 945 (1934).
20 141 F.2d 564 (3d Cir. 1944); Compare Oates v. Commissioner, supra
note 1.
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circuit held that there was a gift at the time of assignment even
though the trust's interest depended upon the number of renewals
and the solvency of the employer.
In Gait v. Commissioner,21 a lease to racetrack property was
assigned without consideration. The rental under this lease was a
percentage of the parimutuel betting at the racetrack. The
seventh circuit held that a gift had been made on the date of
assignment. "It is true," the court said, "that the value of the
gift as represented by the assignment... was speculative, uncer-
tain and contingent upon future developments.... Even so this is
an immaterial factor in determining whether a gift was made at
that time."22
Even if it is decided that the interest under a deferred com-
pensation arrangement is "property" it might be argued that the
gift of an interest under a contingent arrangement or one which
depends upon the continuing solvency of the employer has no
present value because one of the conditions precedent might not
be performed or the employer might become insolvent. However,
in Robinette v. Helvering,23 the Supreme Court ruled that the
value of the interest is to be computed actuarially, as though
there were no contingencies other than survival involved. Then
the donor must demonstrate the value which the contingencies
subtract from the gift. If he cannot do this, there is no reduction
in value. In the case of contingencies, such as continued service,
covenants not to compete, rendition of consulting services, or
continued solvency, the employee would have great difficulty in
fulfilling his burden of proof and the full value would be, in most
cases, taxable.
Estate Taxation
While the discussion of gift taxation has been hypothetical
because of the paucity of cases, there are many estate tax de-
cisions. In order to understand these decisions, the 1954 Code
must be examined.
Under Section 2033 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
"the gross estate shall include the value of all property... to the
extent of the interest therein of the decedent at the time of his
21 Supra note 16.
2Id. at 50.
23 818 U.S. 184 (1948).
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death." This section should apply if the interest under a deferred
compensation contract passes to a beneficiary either by will or
intestacy, and if that interest is "property," within the meaning of
the term as used in Section 2033. However, if a beneficiary is
designated during the employee's lifetime, this constitutes an
inter vivos transfer of the only interest which passes at death and
must be reached, if at all, under other provisions of the 1954
Code.24
A transfer whereby the employee gives up his rights under a
deferred compensation contract would first be tested against the
requirements of Section 2035 to determine whether it was made
in contemplation of death. If the employee dies within three
years after the irrevocable designation of a beneficiary, the pre-
sumption that this was a gift in contemplation of death25 would
have to be rebutted. If the employee lives for more than three
years after making an irrevocable transfer, the transfer cannot be
said to have been made in contemplation of death, regardless of
the employee's motives, and in spite of the fact that the only
interest transferred was an interest which will not produce any
beneficial enjoyment until after death.26
Section 2036 (a) (1) of the 1954 code provides:
The gross estate shall include the value of all property ... to
the extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at
any time made a transfer (by gift) under which he has re-
tained for his life, or for any period not ascertainable without
reference to his death or for any period which does not in
fact end before his death-the possession or enjoyment . . .
of the property. (Emphasis added.)
It is obvious that the question of whether the interest is "property"
will be raised under this section as it was under Section 2033.
There is another question which may also be raised under this
section. In Higg's Estate v. Commissioner,7 the court held that
in a situation where the employer purchased a nonforfeitable
annuity policy under which a beneficiary had been irrevocably
designated by the employee, there had been no "transfer" by the
24 Estate of Edward H. Wadewitz, 39 T.C. 925, 935 (1963).
25 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2035(b).
26Ibid.
27 184 F.2d 427 (3d Cir. 1950).
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employee, "for the annuity contract was purchased by his em-
ployer."28 If this holding is sound, all that the employee need do
to escape application of 2036(a) (1) is to enter into a deferred
compensation contract which requires that the payments be made
to a named beneficiary after death. However, this holding is not
sound unless we say that Higg's employer made a gift to him and
a second gift to his wife.
Some of the cases decided in this area have made such a
finding when the payments are purely voluntary on the employer's
part.29 If such a finding is made, the employee would pay no
income tax on the payments made to him and no gift or estate tax
would be paid on payments to his beneficiary. In Commissioner
v. Duberstein,30 the Supreme Court held that the question of
whether payments by an employer were gifts or compensation for
services, was one of fact to be decided on the basis of human
experience and the multiplicity of relevant factors.
Even when there is no contractual obligation to make such
payments, a court could find that the payments were made as
compensation for services rendered or to be rendered by the
employee. 3' In such a case or in a case where the employer is
contractually obligated to make such payments, the courts should
hold that a "transfer" has been made by the employee both for
gift tax purposes and for application of the transfer provisions
of the estate tax. As Mr. Justice Stone has said:
Obviously the word "transfer" in the statute, or the privilege
which may constitutionally be taxed, cannot be taken in such
a restricted sense as to refer only to the passing of particular
items of property directly from the decedent to the transferee.
28 Id. at 431.29 Estate of William E. Barr, 40 T.C. 227 (1963); Worthen v. United States,
192 F. Supp. 727, 734 (D.C. Mass. 1961); Hanner v. Glenn, 212 F.2d 483 (6th
Cir. 1954); Estate of Eugene F. Saxton, 12 T.C. 569(1949); Estate of Emil A.
Stake, 11 T.C. 817 (1948).80363 U.S. 278 (19603.
31Rosenberg v. Unite States, 309 F.2d 724 (7th Cir. 1962); see Simpson
v. United States, 261 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1958); Gather's Estate v. Commissioner,
271 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1959). In Estate of Albert A. Salt, 17 T.C. 92 (1951) the
court found a purely voluntary plan even though no beneficiary had been denied
payment for 15 years. The court based its decision on the fact that the pension
board bad discretion so that it could deny payment. Such a decision ignores the
fact that a program of this type is designed-to produce continued faithful service
by the employee during his lifetime. Sutro v. United States, 42-2 U.S. T.C.
10, 215 (D.C. N.D. Cal. 1942).
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It must, we think, at least include the transfer of property
procured through expenditure by the decedent with the pur-
pose, effected at his death, of having it pass to another.32
As we have seen, Section 2036(a) (1) will reach the situation
in which deferred benefits are paid to the employee during his
life and then to a beneficiary at his death, provided that there
has been a "transfer," and if the interest transferred is "property."
If deferred benefits are not paid to the employee during his life,
that Section will not apply. However, in such a situation Section
2036(a) (2) or Section 2038 may apply. These sections reach
transfers of property made by the decedent under which he
reserves the powers to alter, amend, revoke or terminate the
beneficial enjoyment of the property. Under these sections the
same question of whether there was a "transfer" by the decedent
and whether the interest transferred was "property" are presented.
Section 2039 appeared for the first time in the 1954 Code.
When the House of Representatives proposed this provision, its
report stated:
It is not clear under existing law whether an annuity . . .
purchased by the decedents employer, or an annuity to which
both the decedent and his employer made contributions is
includible in the decedents gross estate.33
The provision which as enacted reads as follows:
(a) The gross estate shall include the value of an annuity or
other payment receivable by any beneficiary by reason of sur-
viving the decedent under any form of contract or agreement
entered into after March 8, 1931 (other than as insurance
under policies on the life of the decedent), if under such
contract or agreement, an annuity or other payment was pay-
able to the decedent or the decedent possessed the right to
receive such annuity or payment either alone or in conjunction
with another for his life or for any period not ascertainable
without reference to his death or for any period which does
not in fact end before his death. (Emphasis added.)
(b) AmouNT iNc.ul BEI-Subsection (a) shall apply to only
such part of the value . . .as is proportionate to that part
of the purchase price therefor contributed by the decedent
... any contribution by the decedent's employer or former
32 Chase National Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 827, 387 (1929).
33 H. Rep. #1837, 83d Cong. 2d Sess., 90 (1954).
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employer ... shall be considered to be contributed by the
decedent if made by reason of his employment. (Emphasis
added.)
(c) (Exemption for qualified plans.) 34
This section is not a transfer section; it would apply con-
currently with Section 2033 if the beneficiary is not irrevocably
designated during the life of the employee. It would also apply
to situations in which Section 2036(a) (1) applies. But, if the
employee receives no payment or if the beneficiary's receipt or
right to receive payments is not measured by his life, for a period
not ascertainable without reference to his death, or for a period
which in fact ends with his death, this section does not apply at
all.
In the situations where it applies, this Section eliminates the
use of the word "property"; but it does not eliminate the problem.
What does "annuity or other payment" mean? Could "other
payment" mean "other similar payment," i.e., a funded contract?
In fact, the bill as originally proposed by the House of Repre-
sentatives, did say "other similar payment." 5 The Senate amended
this clause, but the committee report is silent about the reason
for the change. All that is said is that the change is designed to
make it clear that this section applies, "not only to cases where
an annuity is payable to a decedent, but also to contracts or
agreements under which a lump sum payment was payable to
the decedent or the decedent possessed the right to receive such
a lump sum payment in lieu of an annuity."36 Every example in
the committee reports and the Regulations involves a funded
arrangement. It would seem that the term "other payment" still
leaves the question of whether an unfunded contract is includible
under Section 2039.
The requirement of a "transfer" is also eliminated and the
regulations state, in an example which is designed to indicate
that Higg's Estate v. Commissioner37 is no longer applicable, that
"all rights and benefits accruing to an employee and to others by
reason of the employment ... are considered together . . .the
34 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2039.
3 H.R. 8300, 83d Cong. 2d Sess. Sec. 2039 (1954), as originally proposed.
See H.R. Rep. #1387, 83d Cong. 2d Sess., A816 (1954).3 6 Sen. Rep. #1622, 8d Cong., 2d Sess., 470 (1954).37 Supra note 15.
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scope of Section 2039(a) & (b) cannot be limited by indirec-
tion."8  But under Section 2039(a) it is still open to a court to
find that the payments were not "receivable... under any form
of a contract or agreement"; or to find under Section 2039(b)
that the employer's contributions cannot be attributed to the
decedent because they were not "made by reason of his employ-
ment." 9
In short, in the areas where most of the estate tax problems
occur, i.e., unfunded contracts and noncontractual arrangements,
Section 2039 does not clarify the law. Of course, it does contain
new phrases and the courts could regard it as a mandate to
abandon the old distinctions, and to date the courts have done
just that.
In Bahen's Estate v. United States,40 the Court of Claims
applied Section 2039 to two plans which were unfunded. The
court noted that the new statute abandoned the terms "transfer"
and "property" and said, "We must pay heed to the precise new
form in which Congress cast its net and not become entangled
in the older meshes."4' The court indicates that the Regula-
tions, 42 sanction inclusion of unfunded as well as funded plans.
It does not read "other payments" as being limited to other funded
arrangements.4 3
The problem of defining "property" for estate tax purposes is
much the same as it was for gift tax purposes. The purpose of the
two taxes is essentially the same, and the courts have repeatedly
said that the two taxes should be read in pari materia. The con-
clusions that "property" should have the same definition under
both the estate and the gift tax and should be based upon general
principles such as those announced by Mr. Justice Stone in Smith
v. Shaughnessy" seem inescapable.
3 8 Treas. Reg. Sec. 20.2039-1(b) (2), Example 6.
39 See footnote 29 supra.
40305 F.2d 827 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
41 Id. at 829.42 Treas. Reg. 20.2039-1(b), cited at 830.
43 It should be noted that upon reading the Regulations there is no statement
that unfunded plans fall within the purview of § 2039. The Regulations carefully
follow the language of the statute on this point and none of the examples deals
with an unfunded plan. This case is also significant in that it approves Section
20.2039-1(b) (2) Example 6 which says that two plans maybe considered
together in order to invoke the application of Section 2039. See also All v.
McCobb, 321 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1963).
44 Supra note 18.
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The villain in this situation may be the Commissioner himself.
In 1937, a General Counsel's Memo was issued which ruled that
a sum paid to a beneficiary under an employee's death benefit
plan was not an interest in property but was only an "expectancy"
because the employer had a right to modify the plan.45 This
ruling was emphasized by the court in Dimock v. Corwin46 which
pointed out,
The right to nominate or designate the person to receive the
death benefit could not have been levied upon to satisfy a
judgment against the decedent during his lifetime; had he
become bankrupt, his trustee could not have realized anything
thereon for creditors, nor could it have been sold or assigned
by the decedent because it was merely a privilege extended to
him by his employer, which was subject to withdrawal or
modification at any time, under the quoted terms of the plan.47
(Emphasis added.)
Both the original treasury statement and the ruling in Dimock
v. Corwin may be sound. As in the case of a transfer, the question
should be one of fact and should depend upon whether the
employer's action was designed as compensation for services.48
In cases where payment by the employer to an employee's bene-
ficiary are truly voluntary, it does not seem unsound to classify
whatever interest the employee may have had as an "expectancy."
However, when payments are made pursuant to a contract or
long standing practice, a determination that such rights are an
"expectancy" and not "property," seems unwarranted.
Nevertheless, in Commissioner v. Twogoocs Estate,49 the sec-
ond circuit held that under an unfunded arrangement which was
forfeitable, the interest transferred when a beneficiary was ir-
revocably designated was not "property" under the transfer pro-
visions.50 The court looked only at the moment of transfer because
it said that the property and the transfer must be causaly related.51
45 G.C.M. 17817, 1937-1 Cum. Bull. 281 (1937).
46 19 F. Supp. 56 (D.C.E.D. New York, 1937), aff., on other grounds, 99
F.2d 799 aff. sub. nom. 306 U.S. 363.
47 Id. at 59. The Treasury changed its position in G.C.M. 27242, 1952-1 Cum.
Bull. 160. But the ruling in Dimock v. Corwin was followed in Molter v. United
States, 146 F. Supp. 497 (D.C.E.D. New York, 1956).
48Supra note 29.
49 194 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1952).50 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 811(c). Now § 2036(a) (1).
51 194 F.2d 627, 629.
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It found that, at the moment of transfer, all that the decedent
had prior to his reaching his retirement date was a right to receive
an annuity which was contingent upon his meeting the require-
ments for retirement.52
In Goodman v. Granger," the third circuit said that an interest
under an unfunded deferred compensation contract containing
contingencies was property includible in the gross estate under
Section 2038. Although this statement is only dicta, because the
interest had been originally included in the estate tax return and
its includibility was not considered in the court below, 5 it does
indicate a sound approach. Certainly the right to receive 10,000
dollars per year for ten years is a valuable right even if it is
subject to certain conditions. If this right must be called "prop-
erty" in order to impose a tax, then that term should be used."5
Even if it is decided that the interest under a deferred com-
pensation arrangement is property within the meaning of an
applicable estate tax provision, or is included in the gross estate
under Section 2039, there is still the problem of valuing the
interest.
In Goodman v. Granger,56 the court made a thorough analysis
of the valuation problem. If the employee's rights are subject to
contingencies this may diminish their value to him; and if the
right is unfunded the value may be further diminished because
of the risk that the employer may become insolvent. In assessing
value for gift tax purposes, these considerations are very trouble-
some because the gift tax must be paid at the time the transfer
is made. However, the problems of estate tax valuation are much
less complex. Valuation of an interest for estate tax purposes is
neither logically nor feasibly administered until death has oc-
curred, and so there is no objection to valuing an interest which
passes at death as of the moment after death.57 In fact, the
52 Id. at 629. See Estate of William S. Miller, 14 T.C. 657 (1950); Estate
of M. Hadden Howell 15 T.C. 224 (1950).
53 243 F.2d 264 (3d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
54 56-1 U.S.T.C. 55, 600 (D.C.W.D. Pa. 1956).
55 See Charles B. Wolf, 29 T.C. 441 (1957), where the court held that an
arrangement which was funded and forfeitable was an interest in property.
Garbers Estate v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 97 (3d Cir. 1959) also contains strong
statements to this effect.5 6 Supra note 53.
57Id. at 268-269.
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executor can choose an alternate valuation date, one year after
death.58
Since the value in question is the value of the interest which
passes by death, a court may disregard contingencies which fail
to materialize. As the court pointed out in Goodman v. Granger,
True the right to these payments was forfeitable upon the
occurrence of any of the specified contingencies. However,
forfeiture as a result of the contingencies never occurred dur-
ing Blum's lifetime and any possibility of their occurrence was
extinguished by his death. 9
With contingencies disregarded, only the solvency of the
obligor remains to diminish the value of the interest. The tax-
payer can offer proof of this issue, but since the Commissioner's
determination is presumptively correct, most attempts to lower
acturial valuation called for in the Regulations 0 will fail.
If John Q. Executive has rights under a deferred compensation
contract and retains these rights until he dies, the lawyer who
plans his estate should proceed upon the assumption that these
rights will be includible in his estate either under Section 2038
or Section 2039 as it has been thus far interpreted by the courts.
However, if he wants to contest this question by relying upon
such cases as Twogood's Estate v. Commissioner,"' and arguing
that Section 2039 applies only to annuities and other similar
contracts, his chances of success will be materially improved if
the contract is unfunded and subject to a large number of sub-
stantial contingencies.
On the other hand, if the deferred compensation contract is
set up so that the employee receives no payments during his life,
or he irrevocably transfers his right to receive payments and
completely abandons control of the beneficial enjoyment, no part
of the interest should be includible in the estate, unless the
arrangement is found to be a gift in contemplation of death.
Section 2036(a) (1) would not apply because the employee
retained no interest for his life or for a period not ascertainable
58 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2032.
59 Supra note 53, at 269.60 Treas. Reg. See. 20.2031-7.61 Supra note 49.
KENruc Y LAw JouRNA[
without reference to his death or which does not in fact end until
his death. Section 2039 does not apply either for the same reason.
Although there may be a few situations in which the estate
planner would find it desirable to make a gift of the entire interest
under a deferred compensation contract, such situations are
unusual. It is usually wise to retain this interest during the life
of the employee because it is a source of security during retire-
ment, and because the employee will be required to pay tax on
this income, even if the entire interest has been given away, and
because, if the choice is between giving this asset or another asset,
the deduction from income available to the beneficiary for estate
taxes attributable to this item would be quite significant.62
Taxation of Payments Made After Death of the Employee
When payments are made to a beneficiary after John's death,
the first question will be whether these payments are a gift. This,
as we have already seen, is a question of fact to be decided on
the basis of "practical human experience and the multiplicity
of relevant factual elements."6 3 If these payments are made
pursuant to a deferred compensation contract, it would be almost
impossible to conclude that a gift had been made. Therefore,
we shall now consider the effect of payments after death of the
employee which are found in fact to be compensation for services.
Section 101(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 deals
with the first 5,000 dollars received by a beneficiary. It provides:
(1) Gross income does not include amounts received (whether
in a single sum or otherwise) by the beneficiaries or the
estate of an employee, if such amounts are paid by or on
behalf of an employer and are paid by reason of the death of
the employee.
(2) (A) (The limit of the total amount excludable is $5,000.)
(B) (There is no exclusion for) amounts with respect to
which the employee possessed, immediately before his death
a nonforfeitable right to receive the amount while living.
(This limitation does not apply to qualified plans.) (Emphasis
added.)
62 See discussion of § 691 infra.
63 Commissioner v. Duberstein, supra note 30, at 289; Compare Estate of
Marvin G. Pierpont, 35 T.C. 65 (1960) with Louise K. April, 13 T.C. 707
(1949).
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An argument could be made that a payment made because
of a contractual deferred compensation arrangement is not cov-
ered by this section because it is not made "by reason of the
death of the employee." However, such an argument is not
consistent with the legislative history of this provision. When
first enacted in 1951,64 the predecessor of Section 101(b) applied
only to contractual payments. The Congressional reasoning was
that death benefits paid by an employer are analogous to in-
surance payments and should be given similar preferential treat-
ment. 5 Then in 1954, the committee reports state "Restricting
the exemption to benefits paid under a contract discriminates
against those who received benefits where this contractual obliga-
tion does not exist."66 It is clear that the Congressional purpose
was to expand the scope of this section, not to limit it.
The argument might also be made that a payment under a
deferred compensation contract should not be included because
it is merely a continuation of payment previously made to the
employee. Such an argument may have some merit; this type of
payment is not really similar to insurance. However, the em-
ployee's death is the sine qua non of the beneficiary's receipt of
payments. Further, this provision does seem to contemplate
payments of amounts which the employee might himself have
received had he survived.67
In Section 101(b) (2) (B) we encounter a concrete reason for
including contingencies in an unfunded deferred compensation
plan. This provision applies to all "amounts" and the Regulations
make it fairly clear that this limitation will apply to ordinary
contractual rights. 8 When the contract is drafted, it should con-
tain real contingencies and care should be used to insure that
the contingencies will still exist when the employee dies. Failure
to take this precaution will cost the beneficiary income tax on
5,000 dollars if an after death payment of 5,000 dollars or more
is made.
64 Int. Rev. Code of 1939, § 22 (b) (1) (B) as amended by Revenue Act of
1951, 65 Stat 483 (1951).
65 Sen. Rep. #781, 82d Cong. 1st Sess., 50 (1951).6 1H.R. Rep. #1337 83d Cong. 2d Sess., 14 (1954); Sen. Rep. #1622 83d
Cong. 2d Sess., 14 (1954).7 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 101 (b)(2)(B), supra.68 Treas. Reg., Sec. 1.101-2(a) (2). For the status of this regulation see the
Hess litigation, 31 T.C. 165 (1958), rem. 271 F.2d 104 (3d Cir. 1959).
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Under Section 691(a) of the 1954 Code, "all items of gross
income in respect of a decedent which are not properly includable
in respect of the taxable period in which falls the date of his
death or a prior period... shall be included in the gross income
(of the beneficiary who receives them), in the year received." 9
The term "income in respect of a decedent" does not have an
entirely clear meaning. However, if termination payments,70
renewal commissions7' and such noncontractual items as bonuses72
and a year's additional salary73 are "income in respect of a
decedent," a payment made pursuant to a contractual obligation
incurred as consideration for services rendered by the decedent
should certainly come within the purview of Section 691.7'
After including the amount received under a deferred com-
pensation arrangement in his gross income, the beneficiary may
be entitled to a deduction. Section 691(c)(1)(A) reads as
follows:
A person who includes an amount in gross income under sub-
section (a) shall be allowed, for the same taxable year, as a
deduction an amount which bears the same ratio to the estate
tax attributable75 to the net value for estate tax purposes76 of
all items described in subsection (a) (1) as the value for
estate tax purposes of the items of gross income.., bears to
the value for estate tax purposes of all the items described in
subsection (a) (1). (Emphasis added.)
The most significant single aspect of this provision is that it is
not a credit against income taxes. It is a deduction from income.
If there is a single Section 691(a) item paying the recipient
10,000 dollars and the estate tax attributable to this item is 8,000
dollars, then the total tax saving for a fifty per cent tax bracket
69For a history of the prior law see Nichols v. United States, 64 Ct. of
Claims 241 (1927); 48 Stat. 694 (1934); Helvering v. Enright, 312 U.S. 636(1941); H.R. Rep. #2333, 77th Cong. 2d Sess., 48 (1942).7oEstate of Arthur W. Davis, 11 T.C.M. 814 (1952).71 Latendresse v. Commissioner, 243 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 830 (1957); Estate of Abraham Goldstein, 33 T.C. 1032 (1960).72 O'Daniel's Estate v. Commissioner, 173 F.2d 966 (2d Cir. 1949).73 Bausch's Estate v. Commissioner, 186 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1951).74 Flarsheim v. United States, 156 F.2d 105 (8th Cir. 1946); but cf.
Lacomble v. United States, 177 F. Supp. 373 (D.C. N.D. Cal. S.D. 1959).
75 The "estate tax attributable is determined by computing the estate tax
with the net value of all § 691(a) items included, then computing the estate tax
without the § 691(a) items. Finally subtract the second figure from the first.§ 691(c) (2) ().76'Net value for estate tax purposes" is the estate tax valuation of all the
691(a) items less all § 691(b) expenses in respect of a decedent § 691 (c)(2)(B).
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recipient is 1,500 dollars, not 3,000 dollars. Nevertheless, this
deduction is important to the estate planner, because this deduc-
tion can be affected by the selection of the beneficiary who is
to receive payments after the employee's death.
Of course, if the item is not included in the estate at all there
will be no deduction. There will also be no deduction if no estate
tax was attributable to the item. However, let us suppose that
before John dies he has the right to name a beneficiary who will
receive 10,000 dollars per year for ten years after his death; and
that the inclusion of the value of this right brings the value of
the estate before taking the marital deduction to 500,000 dollars;
and, finally, that the maximum marital deduction is taken.
If the right to receive deferred compensation goes to the wife,
compute tax including Section 691 item:
Estate before M .D ............................................. $500,000
Less Marital Deduction ................................ 250,000
Taxable Estate .................................................... $250,000
Tax on $250,000 .................................................. $ 65,700
Less maximum state tax credit .................... 3,920
Estate tax for Section 691(c) purposes .......... $ 62,780
Now compute tax excluding the net value of all Section 691
items, which in this situation would be 83,166 dollars. 7
Estate before M .D ............................................. $416,834
Less: Marital Deduction .............................. 166,834
(Under Section 691(c) the estate tax is to
be recomputed without inclusion of this
item at all.)
Taxable Estate .................................................... $250,000
Tax on $250,000 .................................................. $ 65,700
Less: maximum state tax credit .................... 8,920
Estate Tax for Section 691(c) purposes ........ $ 62,780
Total Section 691(c) deduction .................... None78
Now suppose that this right passes at death to a beneficiary
other than the wife. Compute the tax including the Section 691
item, as in the previous example:
77 This figure represents the present discounted value of the right to receive
income. See Treas. Reg. Sec. 20.2031-7 Table 11.
78 See Drye, The Taxation of a Decedent's Income, 8 Tax L. Rev. 201, 214
(1953); of. Estate of Thomas A. Desmond, 18 T.C.M. 889 (1954).
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Estate Tax for purposes of Section 691(c) .... $ 62,780
Recompute the tax omitting the Section 691 item
Estate before M .D ............................................... 416,834
Less: Maximum Marital Deduction
(Notice that the full $250,000 gift
no longer qualifies) ............................ $208,417
Taxable Estate .................................................... $208,417
Tax on $208,417 .................................................. $ 53,225
Less: Maximum state tax credit on $208,417 2,842
Estate Tax for purposes of Section 691(c) .... $ 50,383
Total Section 691(c) deduction ...................... $ 12,397791
The foregoing example illustrates the advantage of an in-
creased Section 691(c) deduction that will be gained by naming
a person other than the employee's wife as a beneficiary under
a deferred compensation arrangement. There is another obvious
factor to be considered. Since the payments are income in respect
of a decedent, the recipient must pay an income tax upon their
receipt. Therefore, it is wise to select a beneficiary who is in
the lowest possible tax bracket. In many cases the estate planner
will find that a trust for the benefit of children and grandchildren
is the ideal beneficiary.
The foregoing example also illustrates that careful planning
for the deposition of an interest under a deferred compensation
arrangement can effect important tax savings. Throughout this
article an attempt has been made to turn the lawyer's attention
to the gift and estate tax consequences of such arrangements as
well as their income tax impact upon beneficiaries. With this
knowledge the lawyer can participate more effectively in the
drafting of these arrangements and can take steps even after the
arrangement has been consummated which will result in sub-
stantial tax savings.
79 When the fall marital deduction is being taken an approximation of the
amount of the deduction obtained by giving a § 691 item to a beneficiary other
than the widow may be made by dividing the value of the item in the estate by
two and multiplying by the expected federal estate tax rate.
